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Reviewed by Paul Horwitz
In an unpublished paper a few years ago, law professor Daniel Ortiz gave
a wonderful performance of a traditional generational move. Call it the “kids
today” complaint. “The last 40-odd years have been tumultuous—within
both American culture and legal theory,”1 he wrote. “In both realms, conflict
has fragmented consensus, unsettled many certainties, and set friends and
colleagues against each other. It was nasty[.]”2
But, Ortiz made quite clear, it was also terrific. “[L]egal theory pushed a
critical agenda” from a variety of positions, all “challeng[ing] orthodoxy—
from somewhat different angles, of course.”3 It was a time of outrage and
excitement,4 “a time when reading law reviews was sometimes exciting and
when many of us thought we were finally getting down to first principles, as
uncomfortable as that can be.”5 There was a sense of intellectual ferment.
More important, there was a sense that these ideas mattered, that there were
actual high stakes involved in legal scholarship.6 Bliss it was in that dawn to be
alive—but to be tenured was heaven itself.7
Paul Horwitz is Gordon Rosen Professor, University of Alabama School of Law.
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See id. at 2; see also Marin Roger Scordato, Reflections on the Nature of Legal Scholarship in
the Post-Realist Era, 48 Santa Clara L. Rev. 353, 355–58 (2008) (to the same effect).
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Ortiz, supra note 1, at 1–2. See also Laura Kalman, The Strange Career of Legal Liberalism 1
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See, e.g., Scordato, supra note 4, at 357.

7.

Cf. William Wordsworth, William Wordsworth—The Major Works: Including the Prelude
550 (Stephen Gill ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2008).

Journal of Legal Education, Volume 63, Number 4 (May 2014)

730

Journal of Legal Education

All that is gone. Exhaustion set in, temperatures cooled, the stakes got
lower. And “[a]s critical turned tired, legal theory turned nice.”8 The word
positively drips with disappointment, even contempt. Kids today!
As a law student at Yale in the late 1980s, James R. Hackney, Jr.,9
experienced the same sensation of excitement,10 albeit from a “transitional”
generational perspective—“old enough to have been a student at the tail end
of some of the clamorous debates, but too young to have been involved in the
initial formations or amid the more rancorous disputes” (3). In Legal Intellectuals
in Conversation, a tremendously readable book and a treat for those who like
biographically oriented intellectual history, Hackney has gone back to kick
over the traces of the past and read the detritus for clues about the future.
Legal Intellectuals in Conversation consists of a series of ten interviews conducted
with some of the leading figures in legal theory who rose to prominence in the
1970s and 1980s. They represent a broad swath of constitutive (or disruptive)
theories of the era, including law and economics, critical legal studies, law
and feminism, critical race studies, law and society, and postmodern thought.
One may quibble with the selections but it is still an extraordinary cast of
characters.
Nor should we neglect the interlocutor. Hackney has done an excellent
job on two fronts. First, he’s a good interviewer, leading the conversation
just enough but giving his subjects ample room to expand on their views
and experiences and take their proper role at center stage. Second, and in
productive tension with the first point, he’s no potted plant. He has a pointed
set of questions here and a point of view about those questions. They are
good questions, and he’s admirably clear about his own perspective. He gives
his subjects something to respond to and push back on. That sharpens the
interviews and makes them something more than mere exercises in self-flattery.
Hackney’s basic thesis or narrative is certainly not novel,11 but it is expressed
well in his useful and short introduction. Stated as an equation, it would be,
more or less, “Wechsler + Warren + Woodstock = Weber.”12
8.

Ortiz, supra note 1, at 2 (emphasis added).

9.

Professor of Law and Faculty Director for Research, Northeastern University School of
Law.

10.

See James R. Hackney, Legal Intellectuals in Conversation: Reflections on the Construction
of Contemporary American Legal Theory 1 (N.Y.U. Press 2012) (“I attended Yale Law School
between 1986 and 1989. It was truly an exciting time to be at Yale, which had more of the
feel of a think tank than a law school.”). It is difficult to tell, but it appears the description is
meant as a compliment to Yale.
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With variations, it is treated especially well in Kalman, supra note 5.

12.

“Woodstock” here stands in, badly but alliteratively, for the events of the 1960s. If there
was a Dionysian strand in the generation of legal scholars that make up the subjects of
Hackney’s book, it is not apparent here. Perhaps its clearest example, Charles Reich,
was really a member of an earlier generation, although there are traces of a wilder spirit,
whether tragic or religious or both, in the writing of Arthur Allen Leff and a couple of
Christian-influenced critical legal scholars. On the whole, however, Dionysianism fell on dry
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Several elements made up the explosion in legal theory in the 1970s and
1980s. First, there was legal realism, specifically “the realist insight that law is
infused with political interventions”13 (5). “All jurisprudential positions postlegal realism,” he writes, “are in some way a response to the central penumbra
ascribed to the legal realists” (5).
The realist insight was seemingly put under the halter and turned to
productive use during the heyday of the legal process school. That school’s
leaders, contemporaries and exemplars of the end-of-ideology school of the
early Cold War intellectuals,14 shared most of the broad liberal goals of the
Warren Court and helped midwife it. But their dedication to craft values, and
their primary focus on the issues of the prior generation, made them uneasy at
best about the Warren Court’s activism, sloppiness, and focus on new issues
such as civil rights. In the long run, they became critics of that court.15
The confluence of the prominence of the legal process school, the rise of the
Warren Court and the civil rights movement, and the eruptions of the 1960s
prepared the ground for a super-charged Oedipal moment (7). A generation
of future legal scholars entered law school in a state of “uncritical adoration”
for the Warren Court16 and found their elders morally lacking for failing to
feel the same way.17 Vietnam and the events of 1968 further radicalized the new
generation. Morton Horwitz recalls: “I think that for the first time in Harvard
ground in the law schools and failed to flower—to my mild regret. A little more “whim and
frenzy” might have produced some interesting ideas. Cf. William Powers, Jr., Romanticism,
Liberalism, and the Rule of Law, 69 Tex. L. Rev. 977, 988 (1991) (“In short, law is Apollonian
rather than Dionysian: it is rational rather than emotive; it seeks to control social conditions
rather than submit to them; and it values form over substance, calculation over whim and
frenzy, and dominance over submission.”).
13.

Of course, whether that was “the” realist insight, and how novel it was to the realists, is
an ongoing subject of debate. See, e.g., Brian Z. Tamanaha, Beyond the Formalist-Realist
Divide: The Role of Politics in Judging (Princeton Univ. Press, 2009). Little turns on this
for present purposes, so long as it was the lesson that others took from the realists. Hackney
is careful to refer to the law/politics insight only as an idea “ascribed to the legal realists.”
Hackney, supra note 10, at 5 (emphasis added).

14.

See, e.g., Jerold S. Auerbach, Unequal Justice: Lawyers and Social Change in Modern
America 260 (Oxford Univ. Press 1976) (describing the legal process school as a “school
of jurisprudence . . . that was perfectly attuned to the end-of-ideology politics of the Cold
War”); Neil Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence 276 (Oxford Univ. Press 1995) (to
same effect).

15.

See, e.g., Kalman, supra note 5, at 35–42; Stephen M. Feldman, From Modernism to
Postmodernism in American Legal Thought: The Significance of the Warren Court, in The
Warren Court: A Retrospective 324 (Bernard Schwartz ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1996).

16.

See Justin Driver, The Constitutional Conservatism of the Warren Court, 100 Cal. L. Rev.
1101, 1108 (2012); see Feldman, supra note 15, at 1103–04 (arguing that on this point, little has
changed in decades: “Now as then, liberal law professors overwhelmingly sing the Warren
Court’s praises.”).

17.

Hackney’s interview with Morton Horwitz is illustrative. See, e.g., Hackney, supra note 10, at
68 (“Henry Hart is a wonderful example of what was wrong with Harvard Law School and
one of the most brilliant of its representatives.”).
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Law School’s history there was contempt for professors as apolitical pedants,
if not worse. The Vietnam War and the civil rights movement produced a
major political reaction among the students” (68). The reaction was even more
intense at Yale.18
Developments in legal theory over the next two decades were “in many
ways an extension of the sometimes-tumultuous social forces and legal
developments that marked the 1960s” (2). A range of theories and theorists
responded in one way or another to the law/politics distinction, to the politics
of the time itself, and to the perceived failure of the normal science of legal
process to explain, encompass, or guide legal developments.19 To this was
added “an unprecedented demographic diversification of law school faculty,”
which introduced women, people of color, and others who would first join
and then reject the existing critical movements and launch movements of their
own. There were also more conventional liberal or conservative voices, with
their own reactions to these reactions. Everything was fierce, vivid, and grand.
The last part of Hackney’s conventional narrative is the Weberian part, the
denouement. The fermented brew of legal theory settled. Legal scholarship
has become not only disenchanted, but bureaucratic and specialized.20 The
work has become more technical, more “siloed” (16). If there is a reigning
perspective in the legal academy today, it is more likely to be shallow
pragmatism than high theory (13, 16). We are back in an era of normal science,
done by normal legal scientists isolated by the partitions between them. “No
one makes a claim for an overarching theory” (60). The post-1960s era was alive
with a “conversation across perspectives, even if it at times came in the form
of angry shouting” (16). The shouting’s over now. Echoing Ortiz, Richard
Posner tells Hackney, “Today things are much blander. . . . I hesitate to say
this because it’s an old person’s sort of reaction but I do think academic law is
18.

See generally Laura Kalman, Yale Law and the Sixties: Revolt and Reverberations (Univ. of
N.C. Press 2005). Further to my earlier, somewhat wistful point about the emerging critical
generation of legal scholars being finally more Apollonian than Dionysian, John Henry
Schlegel’s review of Kalman’s book nicely summarizes “two quite contrasting things” that
happened at Yale in the late 1960s: “In early spring 1969, a group of law students known as
Cosmic Labs began sponsoring vaguely hippie activities in the Law School Quadrangle,
including a visit of the Hog Farm commune. At the same time, other students began to press
forward on questions of school governance,” including questions of grades. John Henry
Schlegel, Those Weren’t “The Good Old Days,” Just the Old Days: Laura Kalman on Yale
Law School in the Sixties, 32 Law & Soc. Inquiry 841, 845 (2007). The figures featured
by Hackney were much more likely to be the grading reformers—and sometimes gradegrubbers—and not the freaks.

19.

See, e.g., Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in Constitutional Law,
78 Cal. L. Rev. 1441, 1464 (1990) (linking the legal process school to the Kuhnian phase of
“normal science”).

20.

See, e.g., Richard A, Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 Harv. L.
Rev. 1637, 1638, 1687–88 (1998) (questioning the usefulness of moral theory, especially
its application to legal theory, and “relat[ing] this thesis to one of the big and somewhat
neglected stories of our time: the rise of professionalism in a sense illuminated by Max
Weber’s concepts of rationalization and disenchantment”).
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less exciting [today] than it was in the late sixties and early seventies” (60–61).
That makes it all the more important, to Hackney, to go back and ask what
the shouting was all about—although Duncan Kennedy captures an equally
understandable motivation for such a project: simply to ask, “Wow, I wonder
what that was like?” (45).
Hackney gives us a good sense of what it was like. Each interview does a
neat job of setting up the personal and educational background of the subject,
although some are more forthcoming than others. Each does an excellent
job of discussing why the subject went into particular areas of thought and
explaining something about his or her ideas. (It’s not a crib sheet, though. The
explanations are too broad in some parts and too specific in others to serve as
much of a general introduction to each theory or method.) The subjects nicely
discuss how their ideas stood in relation to their predecessors and what they
made of the competing approaches that were flourishing in the legal academy
at the same time. Finally, Hackney presses his subjects—perhaps too hard—to
offer their views about where, if anywhere, things are going next.
It is unnecessary in this short review to summarize everything that is said.
My real recommendation is that you read the book for yourself. But it is worth
making some general observations about the interviews, many of which touch
on similar issues, albeit in divergent ways.
The subjects’ background is one interesting piece of those stories. It is not a
major piece of everyone’s interviews. Kennedy and MacKinnon, for instance,
were both born fitted for the academy,21 and they don’t devote much time to
their origins. For others, those backgrounds still feel fresh: Morton Horwitz,
the son of a cabdriver in the Bronx, coming to City College of New York,
already past its heyday as the “poor kid’s Harvard” (64–65); Austin Sarat, a
“first-generation college student” whose family wondered why on earth he
would go to graduate school (89); Charles Fried as the scion of an émigré
family reborn to success in the New World (189–90); Jules Coleman, a New
York Jew and first-generation college student, with enough youthful angst to
fuel an early Philip Roth novel (206–07).
Motivation is also interesting here. In some cases, it is refreshingly earthy
and mundane. It is useful to remember that even the leading legal theorists
might have chosen law school because “poets don’t make money” (248)
(Drucilla Cornell), or because they were novelists manqué who discovered they
had “the knack for being a law student” (19) (Duncan Kennedy), or because
law schools paid better than philosophy departments (206) (Jules Coleman).
In other cases, what is interesting is the sense that joining the legal academy
represented politics by other means: that legal theory was meant first and
foremost to be a vehicle for political change. Thus, for Duncan Kennedy, the
early divisions among critical legal studies scholars had to do with “how to
understand the role of theory . . . in diagnosing what was wrong with the system
21.

See, e.g., Hackney, supra note 10, at 23 (“I grew up in Cambridge in a milieu where people
prided themselves on their cosmopolitanism.”) (Duncan Kennedy).
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and in establishing one’s utopian project for the future” (30). For Catharine
MacKinnon, theory was in a sense secondary to action; feminist theory was
really about supporting and advancing the feminist movement (130–31). Most
emphatically, for Drucilla Cornell, “the point of philosophy was not to study
the world but to change it” (146).
Related to that, of course, is the 1960s. That decade occupies a key role here
for many of the interviewees. Not for everyone: some were too busy or too
uninterested, at least on a professional level, to consider it much of a motivation
for their scholarly work. For others, the 1960s were everything—and perhaps
still are. This manifests itself in different ways. For the Critical Legal Studies
(CLS) figures, the 1960s are a more or less unmediated direct influence. For
others, the “rioting” and “disorder” of the 1960s supplied the push toward
conservatism (56) (Richard Posner). In other cases, the influence is more
indirect. Feminist theory and critical race theory were responses to issues that
some of the decade’s leading figures neglected. And Bruce Ackerman’s liberal
project—his effort to “consider whether it is even possible to imagine a world
regulated by liberal dialogue”—is described as an attempt to “situate liberalism
as a coherent philosophy” in response to both the crits and the economists and
“their skepticism about the aim of creating a world in which we could talk to
one another” (170).
Two things are noteworthy about this contextualization of legal theory in
the 1960s. First, there is the sense of the generational divide it created. Kennedy
describes himself as “part of a collective generational movement” and describes
the failure of the CLS movement to “bond or link up with people who were
born before 1940” (23, 28). It is interesting to reflect on the differences between
the way that generation responded to its predecessors and the way ours has.
That generation reacted to its elders by rejecting them sharply. Our generation
has adopted a perhaps crueler response: we have repaid our elders, not with
opposition, but by taking them for granted. Having completed the long
march through the institutions, they are treated as . . . institutions. What if
one’s reward for wanting to change the world is simply to be embalmed in a
“See generally” footnote?
Second is Austin Sarat’s suggestion that “the legal academy in general . . .
hasn’t gotten over the fall of communism. And by that I mean there’s nothing
left for any good leftie to believe in” (107). Surely that conclusion applies to
good righties too. Indeed, there is a general sense in the interviews that things
slowed down or stopped around the mid-1990s, and that the last few years
of that period, dynamic as they were, were really just a final canter around
the track.22 No doubt some of this is just an artifact of aging—of the fact that
Hackney’s subjects belong to a prior generation and not the current one. It
cannot be surprising that one’s interest in current scholarship wanes as one
22.

See, e.g., Hackney, supra note 10, at 42 (“There’s a sense in which all these dramatic events were
sort of over by the early [1990s]. Posner’s Holmes lectures [in 1997], with the reactions of
Dworkin and other senior rights theorists, were a kind of last gasp, a fascinating reliving or
restaging of a drama from the recent past.”) (Duncan Kennedy).
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achieves emeritus status and sees that there is nothing new under the sun. But
maybe the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the “end of history” it was briefly
thought to herald, mean more than that. Here is another reason, perhaps,
for the change in sensibility, the return to normal science, that so fascinates
Hackney.
Another important note sounded throughout the book is the one with which
this review began: a sense of the high stakes involved in this period of legal
theory. Consider, again, Kennedy’s description of the goal of “establishing
[a] utopian project for the future” (30), or the strain throughout MacKinnon
and Cornell’s interviews of a deep connection between theory and political
change—of the need to “change the world in a just direction”23 (147). In a
somewhat different vein, the sense of the importance of the theory project is
there in Richard Posner’s description of law and economics and its goal of
identifying “the real stakes in the case and the real consequences” (53). It is
present as well, albeit in a more piecemeal way, in Bruce Ackerman’s various
democratic reform projects (179–87).
It’s not clear that the ostensible goals have changed so very much in
modern legal scholarship. There are still plenty of normative proposals out
there. Most law review articles still end with an address to an imaginary
audience of lawmakers, no matter how fanciful that may be. Nor would it
do to romanticize the past too much. For one thing, the people interviewed
here were also doing paid jobs and busily making professional reputations for
themselves: they were always making careers and not just change. Moreover,
Hackney interviewed the greats of that period, and the survivors. We don’t
hear from the scholars who did normal legal science in the 1970s and 1980s,
or didn’t take themselves so seriously, or concluded early on that the “high
stakes” were anything but.
Still, the sense here of high stakes for those involved is striking. To a much
greater degree, it is absent in the legal academy today. For those, like Patricia
Williams, who were in the vanguard of demographic change and became
deeply involved in struggles within their own law schools as students and
junior professors, it is understandable that the stakes seemed higher then and
that today’s critical race groups seem more like “networking vehicle[s]” (124).
One can understand the sense of nostalgia (although one assumes the earlier
groups were also networking vehicles). Whether it ultimately mattered or not,
an article “mock[ing] the formal conventions of law reviews” had a sense of
serious play to it (116).
Legal scholars today still play with conventions, but it is just play; it is
far too late in the day to take it very seriously. Conversely, the more formally
“serious” today’s law review articles are—the more stuffed the abstracts and
23.

Indeed, one gets a sense that MacKinnon resists the very interview process: that she refuses
to let what she sees as a serious, action-centered endeavor be reduced to a mere passing
historical or intellectual story. See, e.g., Hackney, supra note 10, at 134 (“You know, it is kind of
wild to be asked to recapitulate work that it took years and volumes to properly articulate. If
it could be explained right in a few sentences, I would have done that in the first place.”).
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introductions are with grandiloquent claims of novelty and importance—the
more obvious it is that they are aimed not at judges, lawyers, or even other legal
academics, but at the 24-year-old gatekeepers of the highly ranked journals.
Even yesterday’s nihilists seem more serious than today’s reformers.24 After
God and God’s death, what’s left but Mammon?
That’s not necessarily a bad thing, I hasten to add. War stories have an
important thing in common: they are told by the people who managed to live
through them. The corpses might see things differently. The nastiness of the
fights of the 1970s and 1980s may well have exceeded the importance of the
debates. From a distance, that makes the costs of those wars—no deaths, to be
sure, but plenty of bad blood and blocked appointments—seem simultaneously
tragic and farcical. The combatants were willing to put up with a lot of broken
eggs to get their paltry few omelets. One can understand the nostalgia without
wishing to relive the carnage.
The “kids today” aspect of the book—the observations of both Hackney
and his subjects on the state of legal theory today—is also interesting, although
not entirely illuminating. Although there are still plenty of reform proposals
in the law reviews, there is much less grand unified theory. Today’s general
scholarly work occupies an uncomfortable middle ground. It is neither highly
theoretical nor strictly doctrinal. It is just sort of there, crunching just enough
cases and taking on board just enough theory to get the (unspecified) job
done. It all begins in medias res. There is less—and less heated—disagreement
between legal scholars on foundational issues.
Hackney’s view, one that is shared by many of his subjects, is that this is
the result of increasing sophistication and specialization in the legal academy:
“We have experts within narrowly defined fields talking to one another. . . .
They are very teched up, and they talk among themselves but they don’t have
to listen, or be listened to, with regard to others” (233).
That’s surely an important part of the story, but it’s not the whole story.
There are many more doctorate holders in the legal academy, but they are not
the majority and not all of them do highly specialized work all the time. A good
deal of today’s lowered temperature may be put down to careerism. Much of
it, surely, may be laid at the feet of the subjects of this book themselves—at
the exhaustion they caused and the factionalism and lack of collegiality they
engendered, with a resulting refusal to be drawn into such fights today.25

24.

This takes things one step further than Walter Sobchak, who observed, “Nihilists! Fuck
me. I mean, say what you like about the tenets of National Socialism, Dude, at least it’s an
ethos.” The Big Lebowski (Polygram 1998). The nihilists of the legal academy in the 1970s
and 1980s may be more attractive, in their possession of a certain kind of serious ethos, than
today’s slightly dull, careerist, “normal science”-practicing law professors. (Although some
of the nihilists were surely also consummate careerists.)

25.

See, e.g., Hackney, supra note 10, at 106 (interview with Austin Sarat) (suggesting that later
groups of law and society scholars got tired of the “big fights” and “meta-critique[s]” that
characterized earlier Law and Society Assn. conferences).
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But the results may be more interesting than the reasons—and not always
salutary. Hackney describes things fairly positively, if with a certain sense of
what has been lost. Although he argues that a brand of thin pragmatism is the
prevailing view in the legal academy today, he also observes: “My reading of
the contemporary landscape of the legal academy is that we live in a pluralistic
universe with no dominant theoretical framework” (84). Kennedy’s response
to this strikes me as important: “Most people are just eclectic. That’s not
pluralism. . . . [Law professors draw on] a toolkit that is very divorced from
the context in which the tools were developed, and it’s not necessary to be
particularly proficient with any of the tools” (44–45).
Kennedy makes an important point here. Genuine methodological or
ideological pluralism is one thing. It takes hard work and deep commitment to
do it right. It takes a supporting theory, too, even if it’s a low-level theory. The
kind of eclecticism Kennedy is talking about is another kettle of fish. It allows
for the kind of conversation across the legal academy whose loss is lamented
by almost everyone in this book. But in its lack of commitments or theory, it
risks being shoddy and question-begging. Its desire to escape the political
nastiness of the prior generation renders it susceptible to the charge that it is
little more than an effort to avoid politics altogether, or conceal the author’s
own politics, without confronting the political or theoretical questions that
legal scholarship still unavoidably raises.26 It risks having no “there” there.
Hackney worries too much, I think, that specialization in the legal academy
will result in “no conversation . . .just separate worlds” (85). There are still
plenty of generalists around, attempting to hold conversations across the
academy. He should worry more that those generalists, by being everything
and nothing at the same time, are having conversations that won’t be worth
remembering.
But we should hesitate before reaching this conclusion too strongly. And we
certainly should not leave the final word on this to the past generation and its
casual observations of the present. Nostalgia is a lousy lens from which to judge
current events if we are to judge the present state of the legal academy fairly.
Legal Intellectuals in Conversation may cry out for a sequel in which contemporary
figures get their own chance at bat.
One last thing is worth noting about the book. While it’s not clear it has any
important intellectual implications, one of the features that makes the book so
interesting and enjoyable is its high mensch quotient. Perhaps unsurprisingly,
it is most evident in the interview subjects who see their careers as a product
of accident and curiosity, not as a deeply political “project,” with the loss of
personality and humility that implies. It is simply a pleasure to spend time
with people like Austin Sarat and especially Jules Coleman, who are alive with
26.

See, e.g., Hackney, supra note 10, at 84 (“You can actually see [during job talks] the ways in
which both faculties and the applicants collaborate in avoiding the political perspective.
The simple point there is that if we actually all appointed on politics it would be a disaster.
That insight produces all of these efforts to theorize at an intermediate level of methodology
at which you won’t have to get to the politics of it.”) (Morton Horwitz).
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humor and self-deprecation. Even on the printed page, it’s a joy to be in their
company.
I might close on a somewhat personal note. Most law students who get
something out of the intellectual experience of legal studies find different
ways of mining their education for points of connection that enliven their
studies. For some, the path is through case-crunching and reading of primary
materials. For others, it is through clinical and other practical legal work. For
still others, it is through activism.
For me, it was through intellectual history. After a discontented first semester,
I only began to find my own footing in the law in the spring of my first year
of law school, when I began to spend my evenings in the sub-basement of the
Columbia Law School library. It was a wonderfully dark and lonely place with
most of the lights operated by timers and the shelves filled with the ghosts of
main collections past.
It was there that I discovered and read—often in lieu of my assigned reading,
alas—a host of biographies, histories, and other narrative descriptions of the
Supreme Court and the legal academy in the 20th century. My background
was in journalism, so it’s not surprising that I was rescued from rootlessness
by finding a narrative of modern legal history. That narrative led me to some
of the canonical works in legal theory and to some more journalistic accounts
of contemporary debates.27 Those books helped me find my own place in the
narrative and gave me a context in which to situate and enjoy the primary legal
materials I read for class.
Hackney’s book is a worthy successor to those accounts, albeit one that
focuses only on the academy, unlike many of the histories, of the 20th century
Supreme Court and its bottled scorpions that entertained me late at night
in the darkened recesses of the library. More historically oriented than the
primary theory texts themselves, but more intellectually serious than the more
journalistic accounts, it occupies a useful place between the two.
I fear that fewer students today find the way into the law that I found as a
student. I see many students studying in the bowels of my own law school’s
library. But they are browsing the Web, not the stacks. If they are ever off of
Facebook, they are on Westlaw. There, one sees disembodied search terms,
not trends or developments. There is little distinction there between the old
and the new, little motivation to look to the past and imagine what it was like
or to browse physical copies of new law review issues and get a sense of what
is happening now. Perhaps they get some of that sense from legal blogs. But
most blogs are driven by current news events, not by intellectual currents in law
schools. There’s not much sense of a “there” there—just an endless “here” and
“now.” I fear that we have given birth to a generation that has instant access to
27.

See, e.g., Richard D. Kahlenberg, Broken Contract: A Memoir of Harvard Law School (Univ.
of Mass. Press 1992); Eleanor Kerlow, Poisoned Ivy: How Egos, Ideology, and Power
Politics Almost Ruined Harvard Law School (St. Martin’s Press 1994). The latter, mostly
unread book, is both especially interesting and incredibly flawed.
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everything—except a sense of history and place. Perhaps I’m wrong. Maybe a
few law students out there, lost and lonely, will put down their laptop screens
now and then and just browse in the stacks, somewhere in a sub-basement of
their own. If so, I hope they will find Hackney’s book.
What they will make of it is a different story. Will they find a model to
emulate among these subjects? Will they conclude that it takes a theory to
create a useful conversation and that a little nastiness is well worth it to say
things that are worth saying? Will they long for higher-stakes battles of their
own? Or will they conclude that the true genius of the 1960s generation lay in
its capacity for self-mythologizing, that its fights were mostly silly and we are
well rid of them, that “the death of legal theory” (44) is a net gain, and that
there is more to be gained from normal science than from grand attempts to
shift the paradigm? We must leave it to the next generation of readers in the
stacks to decide.

